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Abstract—We present a scalable, black box, perception-in-the-
loop technique to find adversarial examples for deep neural
network classifiers. Black box means that our procedure only
has input-output access to the classifier, and not to the inter-
nal structure, parameters, or intermediate confidence values.
Perception-in-the-loop means that the notion of proximity be-
tween inputs can be directly queried from human participants
rather than an arbitrarily chosen metric. Our technique is
based on covariance matrix adaptation evolution strategy (CMA-
ES), a black box optimization approach. CMA-ES explores the
search space iteratively in a black box manner, by generating
populations of candidates according to a distribution, choosing
the best candidates according to a cost function, and updating the
posterior distribution to favor the best candidates. We run CMA-
ES using human participants to provide the fitness function, using
the insight that the choice of best candidates in CMA-ES can be
naturally modeled as a perception task: pick the top k inputs
perceptually closest to a fixed input.
We empirically demonstrate that finding adversarial examples
is feasible using small populations and few iterations. We com-
pare the performance of CMA-ES on the MNIST benchmark
with other black-box approaches using Lp norms as a cost
function, and show that it performs favorably both in terms
of success in finding adversarial examples and in minimizing
the distance between the original and the adversarial input. In
experiments on the MNIST, CIFAR10, and GTSRB benchmarks,
we demonstrate that CMA-ES can find perceptually similar
adversarial inputs with a small number of iterations and small
population sizes when using perception-in-the-loop. Finally, we
show that networks trained specifically to be robust against L∞
norm can still be susceptible to perceptually similar adversarial
examples. Overall, we demonstrate that adversarial examples
can be constructed in a black box way through direct human
interaction.
Index Terms—Adversarial examples, deep neural networks,
perception-in-the-loop, CMA-ES.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is well known by now that deep neural networks are sus-
ceptible to adversarial examples: given an input, one can add
a small perturbation to produce a new, perceptually similar,
input that is classified differently but with high confidence (e.g.
[11], [27]). Adversarial examples exist across many different
domains and can be reproduced in physical artifacts. Not only
do adversarial examples exist, they can be found comparatively
easily through many different techniques, even when access to
the classifier is limited to a black box setting. Clearly, they give
rise to immediate safety and security concerns. Understanding
the scope and prevalence of adversarial inputs, leading to their
mitigation, is therefore a key challenge facing the deployment
of DNNs in security or safety critical domains.
A key implicit assumption in an adversarial example is that
the resulting input is perceptually identical to the original
input. Indeed, in many situations, one desires the classifier to
replace human decision making and an example should be con-
sidered adversarial if the classification task is easy for human
observers but where the machine is wrong in unpredictable
ways. In research on generation or mitigation of adversarial
inputs, though, it has been difficult to perform perception
in the loop: the underlying search technique exercises the
network thousands of times, and it is impractical to ask the
user at each step. Thus, most research has focused on using
a metric on the input space, typically the L0, L1, L2, or
L∞ norms, as a surrogate for human perception. Informally,
for an image classification task, the L0 norm measures how
many pixels differ, the L1 norm measures the sum of all pixel
differences, the L2 norm the Euclidean distance, and the L∞
norm the maximum difference in corresponding pixel values.
Thus, algorithms to generate adversarial examples minimize
the Lp norm between an original image and a new image
that has a different classification and algorithms to mitigate
against adversarial examples assume that a network is robust
if it classifies close inputs in the Lp norm in the same way.
Unfortunately, this fundamental assumption may not hold.
Several recent results have pointed out that these norms do
not form reasonable measures of human perception of image
similarity: inputs imperceptible to human observers may have
high Lp norms, and vice versa [26]. This presents two techni-
cal obstacles to developing “human-level” classifiers. First, we
know how to optimize for the wrong thing (an Lp norm) and
we do not know how to scale the search with humans in the
loop. Second, humans are better at providing preferences but
not at providing quantitative norms. Thus, there is a problem of
translating human perception of similarity into a norm usable
by existing techniques.
In this paper, we present a method to find adversarial
examples in DNNs in a black box setting that can directly
use human perception in the loop. Black box means that we
only have access to the input and the output of the network,
but not to any other information such as the structure, the
confidence levels at the output, or parameters of internal nodes.
Perception in the loop means that our optimization procedure
can explicitly ask human subjects their perceptual preferences
in order to select inputs during the search.
We overcome the two technical difficulties in the follow-
ing way. First, we base our search for adversarial examples
on an evolutionary search technique. The specific search
ar
X
iv
:1
90
1.
06
83
4v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  2
1 J
an
 20
19
strategy we use is covariance matrix adaptation-evolutionary
strategy (CMA-ES) [13]. CMA-ES is a black box, gradient-
free, search. It keeps a population of candidates, generated
according to a distribution, and updates the distribution based
on the “fittest” subset of candidates according to a fitness
function. Specifically, in our context, CMA-ES works with-
out any information about the structure of the network or
confidence levels or gradients. In a first step, we show that
CMA-ES with Lp norms can already outperform existing
grey-box and black-box approaches (including those in [1],
[23], [29]). Moreover, we empirically show that CMA-ES can
find adversarial examples using small populations and few
iterations: this sets the stage to include humans in the loop
without high performance penalties.
Nominally, the top candidates in CMA-ES are chosen by
ranking the candidates on the basis of a cost or “fitness”
function, such as an Lp metric. Our insight is that CMA-
ES does not, in fact, require a metric, but only an oracle to
identify the “top K” fittest individuals in the population. Thus,
one could pick the top candidates based purely on perceptual
preferences. In this way, our search is metric-free: in each
phase, our CMA-ES search asks a human participant to pick
the “top K” inputs from the current population which are
perceptually closest to a fixed, initial, input.
We show empirically that for standard benchmark sets
(MNIST, CIFAR10, GTSRB), CMA-ES converges to an ad-
versarial example with only a small population (at most 20)
and in a small number of iterations (at most 200). Thus,
it is feasible to ask a human participant a small number
of questions (in our experiments, around 10) that already
finds a misclassified example. We also demonstrate through a
psychophysics experiment that perception of closeness among
different human participants is robust to individual differences,
and can be different from an Lp norm.
Altogether, we get a black-box adversarial input generator
based directly on perceptual preferences. We compare the
performance of CMA-ES against three main techniques: sub-
stitute training algorithm from [23], the GA algorithm from
[1], and the MCTS algorithm from [29]. Our first set of
experiments uses L1 and L∞ norms and shows that black-box
CMA-ES can be equal or more efficient in comparison with
existing black- or grey-box techniques, both in the number of
successes and in the average perturbation added. Next, we use
CMA-ES to find adversarial examples on different datasets
using human perception in the loop. Finally, we have also
run our technique on networks that deliberately incorporate
robustness in the training [19]. We show that while these
networks are designed to be robust against L∞ norm, we still
find adversarial examples which are perceptually indistinguish-
able. Thus, we believe mitigation techniques should explicitly
incorporate perceptual preferences as well.
We summarize our contributions.
• We use CMA-ES, an efficient black box optimization
technique, to craft adversarial examples in a fully black
box manner, without requiring knowledge about the net-
work nor requiring training a new model.
• We propose the first perception-in-the-loop search for
crafting adversarial examples and empirically demon-
strate its efficiency on MNIST, CIFAR10, and GTSRB
benchmarks.
• We demonstrate experimentally that perceptual prefer-
ences are robust across individuals.
• Using CMA-ES on robustly trained networks, we argue
that networks should be made robust using human per-
ception instead of other norms.
II. RELATED WORK
a) White-box adversarial examples: Vulnerability of
deep neural networks (DNNs) to adversarial inputs was
pointed out in [3], [27]. Such adversarial examples were ini-
tially constructed by assuming full knowledge of the network’s
architecture and its parameters. For example, [27] optimized
the network’s prediction error and [11] used a fast gradient
sign method to search for perturbed inputs with incorrect
classification. The latter technique was extended in DeepFool
[20] using variable gradient steps.
The papers [11] and [20] formulate the problem in a non-
targeted manner, i.e., crafting adversarial examples for having
an arbitrary misclassification (i.e., a classification different
from the original input). Later, [24] proposed a targeted
misclassification algorithm for finding perturbed inputs that
result in a specific output classification. All these algorithms
are white box: they use knowledge of the DNN architecture
in the search for misclassifying perturbations.
b) Black and grey-box adversarial examples: In con-
trast to the white-box approaches, [23] proposed a black-
box approach that does not require any knowledge of the
network. Their approach requires access to the input-output
data only but assumes accessibility of a fraction of the test
data with which the DNN was evaluated. The approach of
[23] has two stages for crafting adversarial examples. First,
it feeds the DNN with significant amount of data, stores
collected input-output pairs, and uses that data as labeled
examples to train a substitute neural network with possibly
different architecture. Once the substitute network is trained,
they employ white-box methods such as the one in [11] to craft
misclassifying examples, relying on a transference heuristic.
The main disadvantage of this approach is that the adversarial
examples are crafted on the substitute network, without any
guarantee on misleading the original DNN. The implementa-
tion results of [23] also reveal that the transferability of the
crafted adversarial samples is in general not very high.
Grey-box approaches craft adversarial inputs based on the
input-output behavior as well as some extra information such
as the output of the DNN’s softmax layer. For example,
[29] craft adversarial examples in image classification tasks
by first identifying the key points of the input image using
object detection methods such as SIFT (Scale Invariant Feature
Transform) and then using Monte Carlo tree search to select
pixels around the key points which affect the softmax layer
(the confidence levels) the most. In [21] another query-based
local-search technique is proposed to choose pixels to perturb
which minimize confidence level associated with true class
of the input image. [1] provides a gradient-free approach for
crafting adversarial examples, based on Genetic Algorithms
(GA). Later, [28] combines GA with a gradient-estimation
technique to craft adversarial examples for applications in
automatic speech recognition. [2], [5], use finite differences to
estimate gradiant of loss function which is then leveraged in
white-box based attacks. In [16] a query-efficient method for
estimating the gradient is proposed which is then leveraged to
performs a projected gradient descent (PGD) update. However,
their method requires several thousands of queries on average
to mislead the DNN.
c) Mitigation strategies: The widespread existence of
adversarial attacks led to research on mitigation strategies. The
research can be divided into two categories: either improve
the DNN robustness or detect adversarial examples. Strategies
in the first category target at improving the training phase in
order to increase the robustness and classification performance
of the DNN. [11] suggests that adding adversarial samples to
the training set can act as a regularizer. It is also observed in
[23] that training the network with adversarial samples makes
finding new adversarial samples harder. [10] shows that new
samples can be obtained from a training set by solving a
game between two DNNs. Recent papers [9], [19] have used
abstract interpretation for training DNNs that are guaranteed
to be robust. In particular, [19] constructs approximations
of adversarial polytopes, which describe the set of possible
neural network outputs given the region of possible inputs,
and trains the network on the entire input space. This results
in networks that are more robust. Most of this line of research
pick a norm (L1 or L∞) as a measure for robustness: the loss
function during training ensures there is a neighborhood (in the
chosen norm) around test inputs with the same classification.
However, we show that our technique can find adversarial
examples under the perceptual norm even on robustly trained
networks.
The second category of strategies is reactive to the inputs
and tries to identify adversarial samples by evaluating the
regularity of samples [23]. These strategies are not effective
against samples crafted by our approach: the optimization
has human perception in the loop and crafts samples without
irregularities seen in the outcome of other approaches.
d) Choosing dissimilarity measures: An adversarial ex-
ample is found by adding perturbation to the original input
image until the classifier is misled. Obviously, the classifier is
not expected to classify the adversarial example the same as for
the original input image if the amount of perturbation is high.
An implicit assumption in most work on adversarial examples
is that the inputs are perceptually indistinguishable to a human
observer (see e.g., [4], [8], [25]). Most approaches for crafting
adversarial examples have been founded on optimising a cost
(or loss) function, typically Lp norms, p ∈ {∞, 0, 1, 2, · · · },
as a proxy for human perception [11], [12], [23], [27]. For any
two vectors v = [v1, v2, . . . , vn]T and v′ = [v′1, v
′
2, . . . , v
′
n]
T
representing two images, their dissimilarity can be measured
by L0 norm as ||v − v′||0 = #{i, vi 6= v′i}, by L∞ norm as
||v−v′||∞ = maxi{|vi−v′i|}, or by Lp norm, p ∈ {1, 2, . . .},
as
||v − v′||p = (Σni=1|vi − v′i|p)
1
p .
In the context of adversarial examples, L0 measures the
number of perturbed pixels, L1 gives the sum of absolute
perturbations, and L∞ measures the maximum perturbation
applied to the pixels. The computation of Lp norm can be
performed rapidly in computational tools; this is important
because current techniques rely on a large number of evalua-
tions of the dissimilarity measure. Thus, strategies for crafting
adversarial examples and for mitigating them, rely on the
assumption that the Lp norm evaluates dissimilarities close
enough to the way humans interpret these differences.
Unfortunately, this assumption is not well-founded: inputs
close in the Lp norms may be neither necessary nor sufficient
for images to be perceptually similar [8], [17], [26]. Thus,
a major open question is to incorporate perceptual measures
directly in the training of machine learning classifiers.1 The
main challenges are that perceptual preferences do not directly
provide a (differentiable) cost function, and involving a per-
ceptual task in an exploration loop makes the search very slow.
We solve the problem of crafting adversarial inputs with
perceptual similarity in the following way. First, our approach
is black-box, and does not require finding gradients. Second,
our approach using CMA-ES does not require a metric space
on inputs, but only requires selecting the “top K” closest
inputs. Thus, we naturally incorporate an easy perception
task (“pick the preferred K images”) in the search. We
show empirically that the process converges in only a few
iterations, making it feasible to find examples even with the
cost of human perception in the loop. Finally, we show that
the perceptual task is robust across humans and that top-K
perceptual selection performed by humans can be different
from selecting the top K according to an L1 norm.
Use of perceptual preferences in learning and classification
have been approached in other domains [6], [18], [30]. Our
work demonstrates the applicability of perceptual preferences
in the task of finding adversarial examples. We note that there
is recent work on the “dual problem” of finding adversarial
examples which fool both humans and machines [7]. Whether
our approach generalizes to these problems or whether mitiga-
tion measures can use perception-in-the-loop is left for future
work.
III. THE ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLE PROBLEM
A. Deep Neural Networks
A classifier G : Rd → {1, 2, . . . , L} is a function that
maps an input x ∈ Rd to one of L possible labels. A deep
neural network (DNN) N with depth n is a parameterised
1 Of course, there are situations in which perceptual similarity is neither
possible (e.g., in classification tasks unrelated to perception) nor the goal of
an attack [22]; we focus on important scenarios where perception does play
an important role.
representation of a classifier G(θ, ·) : Rd → RL that is
constructed by a forward combination of n functions:
G(θ, x) := Gn(θn,Gn−1(θn−1, · · · G2(θ2,G1(θ1, x)))), (1)
where x denotes the input to the DNN and Gi(θi, ·), i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n}, denote non-linear functions (called layers), each
parameterised by θi. Each layer of the network Gi takes its
input as a representation of the input data and transforms it to
another representation depending on the value of parameters
θi. The label associated to input x by the DNN N is obtained
by finding the component of G(θ, x) with the highest value:
N(θ, x) = arg max
j∈{1,2,··· ,L}
G(j)(θ, x), (2)
where G(j) is the jth element of the output vector G.
During the training phase of the network, the set of pa-
rameters θ is learnt using a large number of labeled input-
output pairs {(xi, yi) | i = 1, 2, . . . ,m} in order to achieve
the highest performance by N(θ, ·) in mimicking the original
unknown classifier G(·) on the available data. During the
test phase of the netowrk, N is deployed with the fixed
learned parameters θ` and used to make predictions about
the lables of inputs not seen during the training. The network
is expected to generalize the training data set and to make
accurate classifications on the test data set.
B. Adversary’s Goal
Given a network N with learned parameters θ` and an input
x, the goal of the adversary is to find an input x′ such that
N(θ`, x
′) 6= N(θ`, x), i.e., the two images are classified in
two different classes, while x, x′ are “similar” as much as
possible. One way to assess similarity is to define a metric
space ‖ · ‖∗ on the space Rd of inputs, for example, using an
Lp norm. Then, the non-targeted misclassification problem is
to find
xadv(x,N) = arg min
x′
{‖x− x′‖∗, | N(θ`, x′) 6= N(θ`, x)} .
(3)
The problem is non-targeted because we only require a
misclassification and not any specific label for xadv.
Alternatively, we can require a specific label for xadv, and
define the targeted misclassification problem:
xadv(x, j,N) = arg min
x′
{‖x− x′‖∗, N(θ`, x′) = j} ,
for any j 6= N(θ`, x).
We present our results for non-targeted misclassification but
the results are applicable to the targeted case as well. In the
experimental results of Section V, we use L1 and L∞ norms
for measuring distances between inputs in order to compare
our results with the approaches in the literature.
For perception in the loop, we use the following formula-
tion:
xadv(x,N) = arg min
x′
{dper(x, x′), N(θ`, x′) 6= N(θ`, x)} ,
(4)
where we require that the function dper(x, x′) is such that for
any fixed x, dper(x, ·) induces a total order on the set of inputs.
CMA-ES Algorithm
Input image
(1)
(2)
(3)
Fig. 1. Running CMA-ES with human in the loop that includes (1) generating
certain number of adversarial candidates by the CMA-ES; (2) selecting top
candidates most similar to the reference image by the user; (3) feeding selected
candidates back to the CMA-ES.
Formally, dper(x, ·) is antisymmetric and transitive, and for
any x′, x′′, either dper(x, x′) ≤ dper(x, x′′) or dper(x, x′′) ≤
dper(x, x
′). With these properties, we can solicit preferences
from human users to select the top k inputs from a set which
are “most similar” to a given input.
C. Adversary’s Capabilities
We work in the black-box setting. The adversary can query
the DNN N on a given input x and receive the output label
N(θ`, x). However, the adversary does not know the depth, the
parameters θ`, or the confidence levels. This assumption makes
adversaries considered in our work weaker but more realistic
in comparison with the ones in [11], [27], [29], since output
labels contain less information about the model’s behavior.
Note that gradient based methods of [11], [24], [27] cannot be
utilized for crafting adversarial examples since the adversary
has no knowledge of the DNN’s parameters or confidence
levels.
IV. COVARIANCE MATRIX ADAPTATION EVOLUTION
STRATEGY (CMA-ES)
A. Basic Algorithm
CMA-ES [13] is an efficient optimization method belonging
to the class of evolutionary algorithms. It is stochastic and
derivative-free, and can handle non-linear, non-convex, or dis-
continuous optimization problems. It is based on the principle
of biological evolution that is inspired by the repeated interplay
of variation and selection.
The algorithm proceeds in generations. In each generation, it
generates a new population of candidate solutions by variation
of the “best” candidates of the previous generation in a
stochastic way. Then, it ranks a subset of the current popula-
tion according to a fitness function; this subset becomes the
parents in the next generation. This leads to get more and more
individuals with better fitness over successive generations.
CMA-ES has been shown to be very efficient on a number of
domains [14], [15], without requiring large sample populations
or carefully scaled fitness functions [13].
New individuals are sampled from a multivariate normal
distribution whose parameters are updated using the parents
from the previous generation. Variation is captured by updating
the mean value of the distribution and adding a zero-mean
stochastic perturbation. CMA-ES adapts the covariance matrix
of the distribution by learning a second order model of the
underlying fitness function. CMA-ES requires only the ranking
between candidate solutions in order to learn the sample
distribution: neither derivatives nor the function values are
needed.
We present the essential steps of the CMA-ES algorithm
following [13]. Let us fix the size of the population L ≥ 2 for
each generation and a parameter K < L. The parameter K
determines the size of the “most fit” sub-population that will
be used to update the distribution in the next generation. In
each generation g = 0, 1, . . ., the algorithm maintains an n-
dimensional multivariate normal distribution (µg, Cg, γg) with
mean µg , covariance matrix Cg , and step size γg . Here, n is
the dimension of the solution.
To go from generation g to generation g+1, we first sample
a population of L new individuals using the multivariate
distribution from the previous generation:
x
(g+1)
i = µ
(g) + γ(g)z
(g+1)
i , z
(g+1)
i ∼ N (0, C(g)), (5)
for i = 1, . . . , L. Based on this population, we update the
parameters (µ,C, γ) of the distribution for the (g + 1)st
generation.
The individuals x(g+1)i , i ∈ {1, . . . , L} are first ranked
according to some fitness function. Let {i1, . . . , iL} be a per-
mutation of {1, . . . , L} such that x(g+1)i1 , x
(g+1)
i2
, . . . , x
(g+1)
iL
is
a ranked version of the individuals in the (g+ 1)st generation
from the best to the worst fitness.
Then the mean value is updated according to
µ(g+1) = µ(g) + cm
K∑
s=1
ωs
[
x
(g+1)
is
− µ(g)
]
, (6)
where cm ≤ 1 is the learning rate, usually set to 1, and
ω = [ω1, ω2, . . . , ωL] is a weight vector with the property
that
∑K
s=1 ωs = 1, ω1 ≥ ω2 ≥ . . . ≥ ωK > 0, and ωs ≤ 0 for
s > K.
The covariance matrix is updated as follows:
C(g+1) =
[
1− c1 − c2
L∑
i=1
ωi
]
C(g)
+ c1P
(g+1)
c P
(g+1)T
c + c2
L∑
i=1
ωiz
(g+1)
i z
(g+1)
i
T
, (7)
where c1 and c2 are learning rates corresponding to the rank
one and the rank K covariance updates. The vector P (g)c ∈ Rn
denotes the evolution path in the gth generation and is updated
according to the following adaptation law:
P (g+1)c = (1− c3)P (g)c +
√
c3(2− c3)κ µ
(g+1) − µ(g)
γ(g)
, (8)
where, c3 ≤ 1 is a learning rate for path evolution update and
κ := 1/
∑K
s=1 ω
2
s .
Finally, the step size is updated as follows:
γ(g+1) = γ(g) exp
[
cγ
dγ
(
||P (g+1)γ ||
E
− 1
)]
, (9)
where cγ < 1 and dγ denote respectively the learning rate
and damping factor for the step size update. We define the
constant E :=
√
2Γ(n+12 )/Γ(
n
2 ), where Γ is the gamma
function. Finally, P (g)γ is the conjugate evolution path with
the adaptation law
P (g+1)γ = (1− cγ)P (g)γ
+
√
cγ(2− cγ)κ
[
C(g)
]− 12 µ(g+1) − µ(g)
γ(g)
, (10)
where C(g)
− 1
2 is the square root of the covariance matrix
defined as C(g)
− 1
2 := BD−1BT with C(g) = BD2BT being
an eigen-decomposition of C(g).
We emphasize that the updates to the parameters only
depend on the top K individuals and not on their relative
order. While a linear ranking function is one way to determine
the top K individuals, the CMA-ES algorithm only requires
determining the top K individuals in each generation.
B. Fitness Functions
We now provide fitness functions in our setting.
Suppose a DNN N(θ`, ·) and a reference input xref are
given. When using Lp norm, we rank the randomly generated
inputs in the CMA-ES algorithm using the fitness function
f(x) :=
{
‖x− xref‖p if N(θ`, x) 6= N(θ`, xref)
M1 +M2‖x− xref‖p if N(θ`, x) = N(θ`, xref),
(11)
where M1,M2 > 1 are very large constants. Then x
(g+1)
i ,
i = 1, 2, . . . , L are ranked such that
f(x
(g+1)
i1
) ≤ f(x(g+1)i2 ) ≤ . . . ≤ f(x
(g+1)
iL
).
Note that f(·) assigns very large values to inputs within the
same class as xref and reduces the chance of having them as
parents for the next generation. Note that the fitness function
(11) is not continuous.
When using human perception, the algorithm generates a
population of new inputs and filters any image in the same
class as the original input xref. The filtered sub-population is
displayed to the user, who is asked to pick the top K rinputs
from the sub-population perceptually similar to xref. Fig. 1
shows a schematic of our implementation.
C. Improving Performance of CMA-ES Using Bisection
To find adversarial inputs, we augment the basic CMA-ES
search using a bisection technique. Briefly, we run CMA-ES
for a number of iterations to find a misclassified input and then
search for another misclassified input closer to the original
input by iteratively reducing certain dimensions and checking
if the resulting input is still misclassified.
XY
0 1 2 3 4
0
1
2
x1x2x3
x∗
xref
Fig. 2. Graphical demonstration for bisection method; xref is the two-
dimensional input; x1 is the example generated by CMA-ES after a few
iterations; x2, x3 and x∗ are computed by running bisection.
Fig. 2 summarizes the technique when there are two labels,
grey and white, separated by a linear boundary. Suppose we
start from an input xref (shown as a red dot) and run CMA-
ES to get a misclassified example x1. Then, we consider the
dimension i of x1 for which |xi1 − xiref| is the largest. We
consider a new input which replaces the ith coordinate of x1
by (xi1 + x
i
ref)/2. In our example, this new point x2 is still
misclassified, and we repeat the process with x2 and xref,
getting subsequently a new point x3, and so on. In case the
new point was not misclassified, we increase the ith coordinate
and continue exploring the same dimension. We continue in
this way to find a new misclassified input x∗ closer to xref
for a pre-specified number of steps. In our experiments, this
bisection technique significantly reduced the distance between
the original input and the misclassified input when L∞ is used
for assessing similarities between images.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS: Lp NORMS
We have implemented the CMA-ES algorithm to find ad-
versarial examples. Our experiments had the following aims.
Baseline Performance Compare the performance of CMA-
ES when using L1 and L∞ norms with other grey- and
black-box techniques in the literature.
Perception-in-the-Loop Find adversarial examples using hu-
man perception in the loop. As part of this process, we
also evaluate the robustness of perceptual preferences.
In this section, we report results of using CMA-ES in crafting
adversarial examples using L1 and L∞ norms, and compare
its performance with existing algorithms. The aim of this
comparison is to show that black-box CMA-ES is comparable
in efficiency to existing black- or grey-box techniques and
to establish a basline performance that is used to determine
population size and number of iterations for perception-in-the-
loop experiments. In Section VI, we report on running CMA-
ES using perception in the loop.
We have conducted experiments on three popular image
recognition benchmarks: MNIST, GTSRB, and CIFAR10. We
compare the performance of CMA-ES against three main
techniques: substitute training algorithm from [23], the GA
algorithm from [1], and the MCTS algorithm from [29]. Recall
that the first two are black-box approaches while the third is
grey box. We use L1 norm in the fitness function of all these
algorithms with a fixed number of queries. Given two images
x and x′ with k channels and resolution h × w, the average
perturbation in the L1 norm sense is defined as:
d(x, x′) =
||x− x′||1
k × h× w. (12)
A. Benchmarking CMA-ES on MNIST
The MNIST dataset is considered to be the most common
benchmark in many previous studies for crafting adversarial
examples. It consists of 60000 grey scale images of hand-
written digits, with resolution 28 × 28 for training, as well
as 10000 images for testing. We split the training dataset
into training (80%) and validation (20%) sets. We trained
two DNNs proposed for MNIST, labeled DNN A ( [23]) and
DNN B2 in Table I. The DNNs are of type LeNet and consist
of input, convolutional, max pooling, fully connected, and
softmax layers. Both DNNs are trained for 10 epochs with
learning rate of 0.001 and the achieved accuracies for DNN A
and DNN B on the 10000 test images are 98.36% and 97.73%
respectively, which is close to the accuracy of state-of-the-art
classifiers on MNIST [29].
We conducted our experiments in the following way. For
each class, we generated 10 randomly selected images from
test dataset, which are classified correctly by the DNN. For
each image, first, CMA-ES was run for 180 iterations, with
population size 4 (L = 4) and parent size 2 (K = 2). This took
about 15 seconds in average. In order to compare our result
with the black-box algorithm proposed in [23], we used their
own implementation for MNIST dataset: 150 samples from
test data were used in input data augmentation; for training
of substitute network, the DNN’s output label was read 6400
times; the architecture of the substitute NN includes input and
output layers as well as two fully connected layers with 200
neurons each.
For the genetic algorithm based crafting method [1], we
achieved the best performance by running GA for 120 gen-
erations including 6 individuals, and setting the mutation rate
to be 0.05, as given in [1]. For GA implementation, we used
the same fitness function as CMA-ES. Notice that the query
length in both GA and CMA-ES is set to 720.
Finally, we took one of the most powerful grey-box ad-
versarial example crafting methods, proposed in [29] into
account. Their algorithm is based on Monte Carlo Tree Search
(MCTS). Apart from GA, for the rest of methods, we ran
authors’ provided codes for both DNN A and B setting all the
parameters to their default values. Tables II and III list results
of running all four methods mentioned above. For GA and
CMA-ES, the success rate is 100%, meaning that for 100%
of tested inputs, an adversarial example is found. However,
success rate for substitute training and MCTS methods is 89%.
2Using available code at https://mathworks.com
(1) (4) (7) (9)
(8) (6) (3) (7)
Fig. 3. Top: Original samples from MNIST dataset; Bottom: Misclassified
examples generated by CMA-ES for inputs from top row
We measure the performance in terms of average pertur-
bation, using (12). It can be noticed that apart from MCTS,
CMA-ES’s performance is significantly better, but the perfor-
mance of CMA-ES and MCTS is close. However, CMA-ES
is superior in terms of success rate.
In all experiments, CMA-ES always found adversarial ex-
amples with less than 7% perturbation in the L1 norm sense.
As a concrete example, Fig. 3 illustrates the case for which the
four input images shown on the top row are classified by the
DNN correctly; however, CMA-ES is able to find within 15s
the corresponding perturbed images, shown on the bottom row,
which are misclassified by the DNN. Increasing the number of
iterations for CMA-ES while fixing other parameters results
in even smaller perturbations.
B. Benchmarking CMA-ES on GTSRB
The German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB)
includes colored (3-channel) images with different sizes. After
resizing and removing the frames of images, the GTSRB
dataset contains 39209 3-channel 40 × 40 pixel images for
training, as well as 12600 test images. We split the training
set into training (80%) and validation (20%) sets. We used a
previously proposed convolutional neural network (DNN E in
Table I)3 of type LeNet and consisting of input, convolution
(×6), max pooling (×3), fully connected (×1), softmax, and
output layers. The DNN is trained for 32 epochs with learning
rate of 0.0001. The achieved accuracy of the trained DNN on
12600 test data is 96.53%.
In order to generate adversarial examples, first, we took all
the 1600 pixels into consideration as optimization variables
for CMA-ES. Again, for each of the classes, we chose 10
random samples from test dataset and ran CMA-ES to find
1600 values as elements of the perturbation vector. We set
the number of iterations to 180, population size to 4 (L = 4)
and parent size to 2 (K = 2). The overall success rate was
97.3% and average perturbation rate was 4.19%. Some of the
misleading examples crafted by CMA-ES are demonstrated in
Fig. 4.
3Using available code at https://chsasank.github.io/keras-tutorial.html
Fig. 5. Original image labeled by DNN as ”STOP” (Left) and perturbed
image classified as ”No entry” after adding 4% noise (Right)
Fig. 4. Top: Original examples from GTSRB dataset; Bottom: Misclassified
examples generated by CMA-ES for inputs from top row using pixel pertur-
bation
We noticed, as in [26], that for RGB photos, there were
cases in which small perturbations in the pixel level (in L1
norm sense) was not compatible with human perception. One
such example is shown in Fig. 5 in which adding 4.01%
perturbation makes the image fuzzy. Thus, in a second exper-
iment, we changed the perturbation criterion to three values
βr, βg, βb as darkening factors for red, green and blue channels
respectively. These darkening factors are in the interval [0, 1],
being equal to one means no perturbation and being equal to
zero means fully darkened. For this new setting, the objective
function Eq. (11) can be written as
f(x) :=
{
3− (βr + βg + βb) if N(θ`, x) 6= N(θ`, xref)
M if N(θ`, x) = N(θ`, xref),
(13)
where M > 3 is a large number. The number of iterations
was set to 3, population size was 240, and parent size was
120. Running CMA-ES in this setting results in 100% success
rate. Fig. 6 demonstrates some examples of adversarial images
crafted by changing color combinations.
C. Benchmarking CMA-ES on CIFAR10
The CIFAR10 dataset contains 60000 32× 32 color images
(three channels) in 10 classes, with 6000 images per class.
There are 50000 training images and 10000 test images. We
trained a previously proposed convolutional neural network
(DNN D in Table I)4 with convolution (×2), max pool-
ing (×2), fully connected (×1), and softmax layers, which
achieved 72.3% test accuracy.
In order to generate adversarial examples, we considered
pixel perturbations with all 1024 pixels as optimization vari-
4Using available code at https://chsasank.github.io/keras-tutorial
TABLE I
DESCRIPTION OF THE DNN ARCHITECTURES USED IN THIS PAPER. ID: REFERENCE MENTIONED IN THE PAPER; INPUT: INPUT DIMENSION;
CONV(a× b): CONVOLUTIONAL LAYER WITH a× b KERNELS FOLLOWED BY MAX-POOLING WITH 2× 2 KERNEL AND RELU AS ACTIVATION FUNCTION;
FC: FULLY CONNECTED LAYER; S: SOFTMAX LAYER.
ID Input Conv Conv Conv Conv Conv Conv FC S
A 784 32 (2× 2) 64 (2× 2) - - - - - 10
B 784 20 (5× 5) - - - - - - 10
C 784 16 (4× 4) 32 (4× 4) - - - - 100 10
D 3072 32 (3× 3) 32 (3× 3) 64 (3× 3) 64 (3× 3) - - 512 10
E 4800 32 (3× 3) 32 (3× 3) 64 (3× 3) 64 (3× 3) 128 (3× 3) 128 (3× 3) 512 43
TABLE II
COMPARING CMA-ES WITH OTHER BLACKBOX METHODS FOR CRAFTING ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES ON MNIST DATA (DNN A)
Method 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
CMA-ES 1.80% 0.91% 2.99% 3.66% 3.96% 6.59% 4.51% 2.30% 3.51% 1.04%
Substitute Training [23] 32% 38.33% 57% 47.5% 42.66% 67.33% 41.33% 39.66% 40.37% 37.33%
GA 15.69% 12.81% 18.52% 19.22% 18.05% 19.14% 18.8% 15.56% 16.31% 15.12%
MCTS [29] 2.44% 2.18% 1.97% 2.09% 2.1% 1.96% 2.81% 2.11% 2.45% 1.73%
TABLE III
COMPARING CMA-ES WITH OTHER BLACKBOX METHODS FOR CRAFTING ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES ON MNIST DATA (DNN B)
Method 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
CMA-ES 0.75% 0.93% 0.33% 1.36% 1.94% 2.27% 3.9% 0.9% 2.9% 0.72%
Substitute Training [23] 22% 25.18% 51.33% 37.61% 27.66% 37.03% 45.71% 23.33% 37.66% 38%
GA 10.07% 10.28% 15.23% 14.27% 11.92% 14.55% 14.29% 9.81% 11.18% 10.79%
MCTS [29] 1.54% 1.61% 1.95% 2.11% 1.98% 1.88% 1.89% 1.72% 1.81% 1.61%
TABLE IV
CRAFTING ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES ON CIFAR10 DATA USING CMA-ES
Source class plane car bird cat deer dog frog horse ship truck
Mean pert 0.67% 0.83% 0.38% 0.49% 0.51% 0.50% 3.98% 0.71% 0.90% 1.38%
Success rate 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Fig. 6. Top: Original examples from GTSRB dataset; Bottom: Misclassi-
fied examples generated by CMA-ES for inputs from top row using color
combination change
ables of CMA-ES. The number of iterations was 180, pop-
ulation size was L = 4, and parent size was K = 2. For
each of the classes, we chose 10 random samples from the
test dataset and generated the adversarial examples. Fig. 7
demonstrates four of these examples. Table IV shows the
average perturbation and the corresponding success rate for
each of the classes. The overall success rate is 100% with
average perturbation 1.02%.
As with GTSRB, we ran CMA-ES with perturbations
βr, βg, βb on darkening colors. We ran CMA-ES for 3 it-
erations, with a population size of L = 240 and parent
size of K = 120. Fig. 8 shows four of the original and
the corresponding adversarial examples. The success rate was
again 100% with average perturbation 17%.
Plane Car Truck Dog
Ship Truck Car Deer
Fig. 8. Top: Original examples from CIFAR10 dataset; Bottom: Misclassi-
fied examples generated by CMA-ES for inputs from top row using color
combination change
Plane Car Frog Dog
Ship Frog Truck Deer
Fig. 7. Top: Original examples from CIFAR10 dataset; Bottom: Misclassi-
fied examples generated by CMA-ES for inputs from top row using pixel
perturbation
D. Benchmarking CMA-ES using L∞ norm
In this section, we briefly discuss the results on using L∞
norm in the fitness function. We ran CMA-ES on the MNIST
dataset using L∞ norm. In this experiment, we randomly
selected 10 input images from each class of MNIST and set
iteration number, population number (L) and parent number
(K) to 3, 240 and 120 respectively. Table V shows the average
perturbations in the L∞ sense to find misclassified examples
with and without bisection. One can notice that bisection
significantly improves the performance of CMA-ES in this
experiment, although the perturbations were relatively larger
than all the cases when L1 are used.
Overall, our experiments indicate that one can find adver-
sarial examples using CMA-ES on a wide class of image
recognition benchmarks with a small number of iterations, and
small population sizes.
VI. EXPERIMENTS WITH PERCEPTION IN THE LOOP
In this section, we describe our experiments running CMA-
ES with human perception as the fitness function. We describe
three experiments. The first experiment (Section VI-A) is a
human subject experiment to check that perceptual preferences
is robust to individual participants. This is important to ensure
our subsequent study is not biased by the specific user. The
second experiment runs CMA-ES to find adversarial examples.
Finally, the third experiment shows that a DNN trained to be
robust against L∞ norm can nevertheless misclassify examples
when run with perception-in-the-loop.
A. Comparing human perception with L1 norm
In this experiment, we study the robustness of perceptual
similarity across human subjects. Twenty students and re-
searchers (15 male, 5 female; age range 22-36 years) partic-
ipated in this experiment. The observers were naı¨ve to the
purpose and the nature of the experiment. All participants
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They volunteered
to participate in the experiment and gave informed consent
in accordance to the policies of our university’s Committee
for the Protection of Human Subjects, which approved the
experimental protocol.
Each stimulus in the experiment consisted of a single image
(the source) and upto 20 related images. The participants were
shown the set of images simultaneously and had to pick the 5
images closest to the source.
In order to create the stimuli, we selected 10 sample images
out of test dataset for GTSRB and CIGFAR10. For each image,
we run perception based CMA-ES for 3 iterations, setting
L = 20 and K = 5. After 3 iterations, we stopped CMA-
ES and stored the population at the last iteration. Finally, only
misclassifying examples were kept. Since L = 20, this number
could be 20 at maximum.
Suppose that ith participant selects 5 indexes for the jth
image. Then, we define hij as a 20 × 1 binary vector with
1s at places corresponding to the selected indexes and 0s
elsewhere. Doing so, we can compute mean vector h¯i for the
ith image. Therefore, we can measure spread of choices, using
the following relation:
 =
1
(np × ne)
ne∑
j=1
np∑
i=1
||hij − h¯j ||1
2
In above relation, np and ne denote number of participants and
examples, respectively. In our case, np = 20 and ne = 10.
Furthermore, division by 2 is included since hijs are com-
plementary for elements at which they are different. In our
case,  = 0.7327. Intuitively, this means that participants are
different in less than one choice in average.
We also computed Hj similar to hij , but with respect to L1
norm ranking. Again, we define
E =
1
ne
ne∑
j=1
||Hj − h¯j ||1
2
to measure difference between the L1 norm selection and
average of participants. We computed E = 1.1844. Intuitively,
this means that participants’ ranking (in average) is different
from what L1 norm suggests in more than one choice.
These results show that human perception is robust across
participants and moreover, the L1 norm based ranking is
different compared to a ranking based on human perception.
B. CMA-ES with Perception-in-the-Loop
We now present adversarial input generation using CMA-
ES with human perception. The goal is to come up with
more realistic adversarial examples with respect to human’s
judgment. In order to achieve this goal we do the following.
First, CMA-ES is used to generate a population of inputs. The
original input and the entire population is displayed together
on a screen. However, any input classified the same way as the
original input is hidden and displayed as a fully black square.
The user looks at the original image and the current set of
adversarial examples. By comparing each example with the
original image, the user selects the top K examples closest to
the original input. We do not restrict the time of the user to
make a decision.
This process is demonstrated schematically in Fig. 1. For
example in Fig. 9, the top image shows a traffic sign and the
next images show 3 iterations of running CMA-ES. In this
example, the population size was set to 20 and the user had
TABLE V
COMPARING PERFORMANCE OF CMA-ES USING L∞ NORM WITH AND WITHOUT BISECTION
Source class 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Using bisection 17.95% 22.16% 20.82% 15.1% 28.63% 13.89% 36.68% 21.4% 20.92% 26.31%
Pure CMA-ES 52.36% 58.69% 63.63% 60.04% 51.01% 62.03% 66.33% 60.48% 58.21% 51.86%
to pick the top 5 closest images. Given the choice, CMA-ES
updates its parameters and generates second set of examples.
This process continues until the last iteration in which user
selects the best example.
Fig. 11 demonstrates three sample outputs of running CMA-
ES using human perception, where the number of iterations
was 180, population size was 4, and parent size was 2. Thus,
the user had to solve 180 perception tasks.
Next, we evaluate CMA-ES with perception-in-the-loop
when the number of iterations is reduced, in order to reduce
the burden on the user. We consider CMA-ES with only
100 iterations, with a population size of 4 and parent size
of 2. Fig. 12 demonstrates two examples in which images
from GTSRB and corresponding adversarial samples crafted
using L1 norm and human perception, with pixel perturbations.
Subjectively, the human perception version looks “better.”
The effects are even more marked when using color recom-
binations. Fig. 13 demonstrates several examples from GTSRB
and CIFAR10 datasets as well as corresponding misclassifying
image using L1 and human perception, when the number of
iterations was 3 and the population size and parent size were
20 and 5, respectively. Subjectively, the color schemes for
perception-in-the-loop was closer to the original image.
C. Attacking Robustly Trained DNNs
Finally, we consider adversarial input generation for DNNs
which are trained to be robust against perturbations. We
consider robust training based on abstract interpretation [19],
which encodes -robustness in L∞ norm into the loss function,
for a user-defined parameter . The goal is to ensure that
each training input has an -neighborhood with the same
classification.
We trained a DNN from [19] for the MNIST dataset. It has
convolutional layers (×2), maxpooling layers (×2), and fully
connected layer before the softmax layer (DNN C in Table I
[19]). We trained this network using their “box” method and
with 4 different perturbation parameters (ε). After training for
180 epochs, we evaluated the robustness of the network against
two attacks: fast gradient sign method (FGSM) with the same
ε used in training and CMA-ES with perception in the loop.
We ran CMA-ES for 3 iterations, with population size 240
and parent size 120. CMA-ES was agnostic to the  parameter,
and considered those generated examples which could be
classified by human eyes correctly, as adversarial examples.
Table VI summarizes the results. While FGSM had a low
success rate, CMA-ES was able to synthesize perceptually
similar adversarial examples, albeit with a lower success rate
than DNN A or B with standard training.
TABLE VI
COMPARISON BETWEEN SUCCESS RATES OF FGSM (BASED ON L∞)AND
CMA-ES (BASED ON PERCEPTUAL NORM)
ε 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
FGSM 0% 0% 10% 23.3% 36.7%
CMA-ES 46.7% 46.7% 73.3% 76.7% 83.3%
An implication of this experiment is that while for some
ε, the network is quite robust with respect to L∞ norm,
it is still prone to attacks which are based on perceptual
norm. Intuitively, this means that the measuring robustness of
trained NNs solely using Lp norms is not sufficient. Fig. 14
demonstrates some examples crafted by CMA-ES in 180th
epoch.
Fig. 14. Some examples of misclassified images crafted on robustly trained
CNN with [19]
VII. CONCLUSION
We have presented a technique to construct adversarial ex-
amples based on CMA-ES, an efficient black box optimization
technique. Our technique is black box and can directly use hu-
man perceptual preferences. We empirically demonstrate that
CMA-ES can efficiently find perceptually similar adversarial
inputs on several widely-used benchmarks. Additionally, we
demonstrate that one can generate adversarial examples which
are perceptually similar, even when the underlying network
is trained to be robust using Lp norm. While we focus on
incorporating perceptual preferences in crafting adversarial
inputs, the role of direct perceptual preferences in mitigating
against attacks is left for future work.
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Fig. 9. Results of running CMA-ES using human perception for an example
from GTSRB dataset; (a): Input image; (b): misclassified examples within the
first iteration of CMA-ES run; (b): misclassified examples within the second
iteration of CMA-ES run; (c): misclassified examples within the third iteration
of CMA-ES run
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(d)
Fig. 10. Results of running CMA-ES using human perception for an example
from CIFAR10 dataset; (a): Input image; (b): misclassified examples within
the first iteration of CMA-ES run; (b): misclassified examples within the
second iteration of CMA-ES run; (c): misclassified examples within the third
iteration of CMA-ES run
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(9) Cat
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 11. Adversarial example generated by running human perception
based CMA-ES; top: Legitimate samples from CIFAR10 dataset; bottom:
Misclassified examples generated by CMA-ES for inputs from top row
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 12. Comparing L1 norm and human perception based adversarial
example crafting, using pixel perturbation; (a): original image; (b): adversarial
example crafted using L1; (c) adversarial example crafted using human
perception
Dog Frog Cat
Car Truck Truck
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 13. Comparing L1 norm and human perception based adversarial exam-
ple crafting, using color recombination; (a): original image; (b): adversarial
example crafted using L1; (c) adversarial example crafted using human
perception
